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Providing Integrity in Real-Time Networks-on-Chip
Eberle A. Rambo, Member, IEEE, Yunsheng Shang, and Rolf Ernst, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Mixed-critical real-time systems must meet strict
integrity, resilience and timing constraints, as specified by safety
standards. Due to the increasing threat of random hardware
faults, efficiently achieving high reliability and dependability calls
for cross-layer fault-tolerance solutions. This work introduces
the Advanced Integrity Q-service (AIQ), a mechanism to en-
sure the integrity and predictability of on-Chip communication
under random hardware faults. Devised for cross-layer and
hierarchical fault-tolerance solutions, AIQ realizes low-overhead
error detection in hardware and delegates error handling to
arbitrary strategies in software. Experimental evaluation featur-
ing benchmark applications and an industrial avionics use case
shows that AIQ operates with high reliability and availability
and low hardware and performance overheads. In a many-core
mixed-critical platform under expected real-time scenarios, AIQ
performs with execution time overhead between 1.4% and 7.1%.
Index Terms—Network-on-Chip, integrity, real-time, mixed-
criticality, dependability, random hardware faults, soft errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN Multiprocessor Systems-on-Chip (MPSoCs)architectures now employ Networks-on-Chip (NoCs)
as the replacement to the non-scalable bus interconnect. In
NoCs, memory operations and I/O are packets traversing a
network. On-Chip networks exist in a variety of topologies
ranging from meshes, as seen in many-core architectures [1],
to topologies optimized for a given MPSoC architecture [2].
Being a central component, the correct operation of the NoC
is essential for the MPSoC. An increasingly relevant threat
to the correct operation are the random hardware faults [3],
which impact the reliability of the computing systems, from
large servers to small embedded devices.
NoC-based MPSoC platforms are currently being evaluated
for mixed-critical real-time embedded systems [1], [4], [5].
Regulated by safety standards [6]–[8], such systems must
meet strict real-time, resilience and integrity requirements.
In that context, threats to the intended functionality of the
system must be detected and handled appropriately to meet
the specified requirements. In case of errors, threats must be
detected and contained to ensure integrity; a recovery might be
performed if possible and if resilience is required for reaching
high reliability levels; and all must be done in a timely and
predictable manner under real-time constraints.
The first resilient NoC for real-time systems has been
recently proposed in [4], [9] with an approach that ensures
the continuous operation of the network after error occur-
rences. The work is based on results of a Failure Mode and
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Effects Analysis (FMEA)-based analysis [10] that is capable
of meeting certification requirements of safety standards and
uncovers all possible impacts of soft errors in the NoC. Upon
error occurrence, the approach limits the error impact in time
and in scope to provide predictability and integrity. Data
delivery under real-time constraints is realized by Automatic
Repeat reQuest (ARQ)-based protocols [9], [11]. Although
the approach successfully increases the reliability of the NoC,
providing error detection and recovery capabilities in hardware
incurs overhead even in the absence of errors, which is the case
most of the time. Errors in NoCs are seldom and the overhead
should be minimized following a “good enough” strategy.
Fast, hardware-based recovery is not always necessary in
cross-layer and hierarchical fault-tolerance approaches. En-
suring the system’s integrity is paramount and seen as basic
functionality, e.g., in [12]. In fact, lossless recovery in hard-
ware requires additional circuitry that can incur substantial
power consumption and delays – e.g., retransmission buffers
in ARQ [11]. Recovery can be performed more efficiently in
higher levels of abstraction, as seen in cross-layer approaches
with replicated execution [13]–[15]. Such techniques exploit
the abundant hardware available in multi- and many-core
platforms to increase reliability and provide error recovery
capabilities in software. Error detection is performed with
hardware support, since software-only error detection is in-
effective and inefficient. The decision to recover and the error
recovery itself are delegated to software.
Nevertheless, the hardware behavior must be predictable
since it is a real-time system, and it must detect errors fast
enough to allow the system to isolate them and prevent
their propagation. That ensures that the recovery, if and as
desired, can be carried out in the proper granularity and
ensures the integrity of the rest of the system. That reveals
two requirements to the hardware operating under soft errors:
integrity and real-time (predictability).
This paper introduces the Advanced Integrity Q-service
(AIQ), an end-to-end mechanism to provide integrity and real-
time guarantees of NoC transactions under errors. The mech-
anism is inspired by the idea of keeping track of transactions
in distributed systems and Hardware Transactional Memory
(HTM). Upon error detection, error handling and recovery
are delegated to software, which may react according to an
arbitrary strategy in a cross-layer approach. AIQ is proposed
and evaluated in a many-core research platform IDAMC [1]
considering aspects such as performance and implementation
costs. Although the idea of keeping track of transactions in
distributed systems is not novel, to the best of our knowledge,
its application in hardware in the context of predictable real-
time systems has not been explored and evaluated.
The contribution of this paper is fivefold: 1 the AIQ ap-
proach to ensure integrity and predictability of real-time NoCs
under random hardware faults; 2 formal communication time
analysis of AIQ in NoCs with formal analysis for both error-
free and error cases; 3 the evaluation of AIQ’s performance
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-201903190937-0
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VERY LARGE SCALE INTEGRATION (VLSI) SYSTEMS 2
in a mixed-critical real-time many-core platform, comprising
benchmarks and an avionics use case; 4 the evaluation of
AIQ’s hardware implementation cost; and 5 the evaluation
of the achieved reliability and availability.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. A
review of relevant related work is given in Section II. The
AIQ approach is introduced in Section III, followed by the
formal analysis in Section IV. The experimental evaluation is
presented in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Fault tolerance in NoCs has been widely explored through-
out the years. Research has explored fault tolerance both in the
link layer [16], [17] and in the network layer [18]–[24]. More-
over, approaches focus on different types of random hardware
faults: transient and intermittent faults [16]–[19]; permanent
faults [24]; or both [20]–[23]. Comprehensive overviews are
found in [25] and [26]. The key technique varies with the
approach: from retransmission protocols and adaptive routing
to stochastic broadcasts. The authors in [21] tackle transient
faults in the link layer with hybrid ARQ/Forward Error Correc-
tion (FEC) and permanent faults at the network layer with a
reinforcement-learning-based fault-tolerant deflection routing
algorithm. A similar approach was adopted in [22]. In contrast,
the authors in [23] employ a probabilistic broadcast scheme to
reliably transmit packets under transient and permanent faults.
In summary, the vast majority of research has focused on
general purpose and high performance computing systems and
their requirements. Due to different goals and constraints, they
are usually not directly applicable to the mixed-critical real-
time domain [4].
Mixed-critical real-time systems have strict requirements
[6]–[8] that call for dedicated techniques that assure safety
without jeopardizing the efficiency of resource usage, the
partitioning-sharing trade-off [5]. A comprehensive overview
on mixed-criticality is found in [5]. In a mixed-critical real-
time NoC, traffic belonging to functions of different criti-
calities coexist [10] and share resources (routers, links and
network interfaces) [5]. Aside from the aforementioned real-
time, integrity and resilience requirements, three points are
neglected by non-mixed-critical NoCs [4]: predictability and
deterministic behavior to enable non-pessimistic, minimum
performance guarantees; sufficient independence between dif-
ferent traffic streams to enable the use of the NoC as a shared
resource by different traffic of criticalities with independently
given performance guarantees; and an error-model that ac-
curately captures all possible impacts of errors, as obtained
by FMEAs and usually required by safety standards [6]. The
interested reader can refer to [4], [10] for further discussion.
Regarding fault-tolerance, beside the aforementioned resilient
NoC [4], [9], another work has recently addressed mixed-
critical NoCs, albeit considering only permanent faults. Mixed-
critical partitioning is employed in [24] to circumvent faulty
routers, which are detected by a built-in self-test.
The concept of transactions has been widely applied in
different fields of computer science and engineering, such as
databases, memories and distributed systems, with the main
objective of ensuring the correct execution of transactions
while increasing performance and parallelism. In database-
management systems [27], transactions are employed to pro-
vide the properties of atomicity, consistency, isolation and
durability. In that context, the concept is used to increase the
level of concurrency, and, thus, performance, in processing
numerous simultaneous transactions accessing a single, large
database. Thus, transactions might be executed with specu-
lative data accesses and its changes to the database/system
are only committed after a validation phase [28]. Speculative
means that read and write operations of different transactions
are performed concurrently and are not synchronized, which
creates a race condition in the event that two transactions
access the same data. If an illegal interleaving of reads and
writes to the database occurred due to the race condition, the
respective transaction is rolled-back and restarted.
Inspired by database-management systems and existing
work on HTM [29], the Transactional Memory Coherency
and Consistency (TCC) was proposed as an alternative to
traditional memory consistency and coherency models [30].
TCC aimed at simplifying parallel software programming and
increasing the concurrent performance of shared memory mul-
tiprocessors. Unlike traditional consistency models, accesses
to critical sections of the code – i.e., lock-based access to
shared memory – must not be explicitly specified, but are
carried out by transactions, which are atomic from the point of
view of consistency. Unlike traditional coherency approaches,
data status synchronization can be performed only at the end
of a transaction instead of every memory access (the actual
operation depends on the coherency scheme). A good overview
of transactional memories is given in [31]. In the context of
mixed-critical real-time systems, HTM has been explored as
hierarchical HTM on distributed embedded systems spanning
over on-Chip and off-Chip networks [32].
In the context of fault tolerance, HTM was explored as a
hardware-assisted mechanism for error detection and recovery
in replicated software execution. The HAFT approach [33]
employs instruction-level redundancy for error detection and
HTM for recovery with compiler-based code instrumentation.
Before committing a transaction to memory, error detection is
performed by comparing the instruction-level redundant exe-
cution. Recovery is carried out by rolling-back the transaction
with HTM. Similarly, FaulTM [34] also employs instruction-
level redundancy and HTM but with hardware extensions in-
stead of a software-only approach. Those approaches are types
of replicated execution [13], [14]. However, error detection
requires all tasks/threads in the system to be protected and
to execute redundantly. A single unprotected task/thread may
cause system failure and violate integrity.
In this paper, the concepts of transactions and ARQ are
employed in NoCs to monitor and to detect random hardware
faults during runtime and to ensure system integrity while not
jeopardizing system performance. The difference with related
work lies in that all communication in the NoC is covered
instead of only replicated tasks, does not require replicated
execution, does not depend on resilient routers, and does not
depend on the components of a tile – i.e., whether the tile
has a processor with caches, only a hardware accelerator or a
memory controller. The hardware ensures that any error in a
transaction is detected and, in a cross-layer solution, delegates
to software the task of handling the error and choosing the
best strategy to do so. Strategies may involve rolling-back,
restarting or killing a task/thread, or failing when no other
strategy can be safely applied – e.g., [13], [14]. Upon a task
failure, the error effects are isolated to ensure the integrity
of the rest of the system. Upon a system failure, the failure
should be signaled before any erroneous output is performed.
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III. THE AIQ APPROACH
A. Overview
The AIQ approach is a NoC service inspired by memory
transactions and ARQ-based protocols. AIQ works as a service
that keeps tracks of transactions across the NoC with respect
to integrity and timing. Figure 1 gives an overview of how
the approach is integrated into the NoC. The AIQ service
operates in the transport layer in the NoC and is located
between the interfaces of the Network Interface (NI) to the
tile internals and the lower layers of NoC. AIQ detects soft
and hard hardware errors and reports it to software. The error
report signaling path is depicted with the dashed arrows. The
AIQ approach delegates to software the task of deciding and
recovering from an error in favor of less hardware overhead:
Since hardware-based error recovery is not required, power-
hungry retransmission buffers and error recovery circuitry are
avoided.
B. Transactions in the NoC
The mechanism keeps track of transactions in the NoC in
principle by acknowledging successful transactions. However,
given the stringent power and area constraints of small-scale
on-Chip networks, a closer look at how transactions take place
over the NoC is required.
A regular, unprotected transaction is usually initiated by a
master who sends a request to a slave, which will receive
the request and respond after it has been completed. For
example, tile t1 synchronizes with t2 by polling the value
of a shared variable in the local memory of t2. Figure 2a
illustrates such a read transaction, where 1 t1 sends a read
request packet and waits for the response. 2 t2’s NI receives
the request packet and forwards the request to the tile. After
some time, depending on the resource contention in the tile,
3 the response is packed and sent. The response packet is
then received by t1 4 , which resumes its execution. Notice
that the lower layers of the NoC protocol stack are abstracted
away for the sake of clarity. Notice also that the same pattern
occurs in case of a write operation or in case of message
passing, including or not a response, depending on the memory
or communication models.
The master might present overlapping memory transactions,
e.g., on memory consistency models where support for non-
blocking reads and writes exist. The master might also support
Direct Memory Access (DMA) transfers, which will overlap
with regular memory transactions when appropriately used.
A slave will potentially receive multiple concurrent requests
independently of the memory model since more than one
master can send a request concurrently. The slave can then
support single or overlapping requests. In the former case,
one request is received and processed at a time, subsequent
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Fig. 1. Overview of the AIQ as a NoC service.
requests are not accepted by the slave until the completion of
the current one. In the latter case, more than one request can be
processed at a time. Potentially, in both cases arriving requests
will queue up in the NoC causing backpressure and head-
of-line blocking, impacting the arrival of subsequent requests
and responses. Resource sharing management is a technique
that allows the predictable management of shared resources,
as might be required in the slave. However, that will not be
further discussed here, and the interested reader is referred to
[35] for more details. For the sake of simplicity and without
loss of generality, the discussion in this work assumes single
transaction support in slaves, unless stated otherwise.
C. Error model
The transactions are composed of packets, which can suffer
a series of different impacts due to random hardware faults in
the NoC. We derived a functional error model capturing all
impacts of soft errors on an unprotected real-time NoC and
their durations. The error model is based on the comprehensive
description given in [10], which is the result of an FMEA-
based analysis methodology that uncovers all impacts of soft
errors in the NoC, as required by safety standards [6]–[8].
On an end-to-end communication stream, as seen by the
NIs, the impact of random hardware faults can be summarized
as follows (packet and data are used interchangeably):
1) Data corruption
• Correct delivery of corrupt data: packet is delivered
corrupted to the correct destination;
• Incorrect delivery of data: correct packet is delivered
to the wrong destination;
2) Data loss: packet is not delivered;
3) Delayed data delivery: packet is delivered with abnor-
mally longer latency.
The error-free case and the case where the error has no
noticeable impact are intentionally left out. Notice that errors
2 and 3 also capture the case where the NoC becomes partially
blocked/unavailable due to a soft error with static effects. Soft
errors with static effects are transient faults that affect the state
of the NoC [10] and, unless they are ruled out with a resilient
NoC, their effects last until the circuit is reset [4].
Hard errors have the same impacts on an end-to-end basis
as the ones listed above but with a different occurrence
pattern. While soft errors are transient or intermittent in nature
and affect traffic randomly according with a probabilistic
distribution, hard errors are permanent and, upon occurrence,
affect the traffic continuously. Thus, the difference between
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Fig. 2. Example of a transaction over the NoC, consisting of a request (REQ)
and a response (RESP).
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TABLE I
AIQ REQUEST/RESPONSE TRACKING TABLE
Tracking Diagnosis
Entry State Type Timer Src/Dst1 Address
1 Used Req1 . . . 0 0xaffd0000
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
n Free . . . 0 0 0x00000000
soft and hard errors is captured in the error model by the
frequency in which a certain error effect occurs. The difference
between hard errors and soft errors with static effects is that
the latter disappear when the NoC is reset.
D. Protocol
AIQ relies on two well known error detection mechanisms
in computer networks: packet integrity check and packet
delivery confirmation. The former is based on Error-Detecting
Codes (EDCs) and Error-Correcting Codes (ECCs) and can
be realized in hardware, or in some cases delegated to soft-
ware. The latter is realized in hardware with watchdogs and
acknowledgment messages, as seen in ARQ-based protocols.
AIQ aims at decoupling the data transport over the NoC
from the processing in the tiles, as depicted in the example
of Figure 2b. The reason for it is that being predictable and
providing timing bounds that include the processing in the
tiles creates a complex circular dependency. The traffic in the
network depends on the processing in the tiles and vice versa.
The AIQ approach should be applicable without previous
knowledge of the tile internals. Thus, AIQ tracks requests and
responses independently in the NoC instead of keeping track
of the entire transaction. That is vital for achieving low error
detection latencies and effectively limiting the error impact.
Moreover, that enables the formal performance analysis and
guarantees of the approach.
AIQ’s objectives are: 1 detect all relevant soft and hard
random hardware faults in the NoC; 2 operate independently
of the tiles’ contents and operation and of the NoC topology;
3 report detected errors with very low latencies; and 4
minimize the NoC’s performance overhead.
AIQ keeps locally a tracking table common for both re-
quests and responses with n entries, as illustrated in Table I.
Every request (resp. response) transmitted by the master (resp.
slave) requires an entry in the table. The entry is kept until
the sender confirms the successful transmission of the request
(resp. response) or until an error affecting the request (resp.
response) is detected. Each entry has a sequence number that
identifies the request/response; a flag indicating the entry’s
state; the request/response type – e.g., read response; a timer;
the source and destination of the request1; and the address of
the request/response. Some fields are used for tracking and
others enable the diagnosis after error detection.
The AIQ protocol is divided in two parts: a master in-
stance for sending requests and a slave instance for sending
responses. A summary of the different scenarios is given in
Table II. They are described individually in the sequel.
1) Requests: AIQ must account for two cases when track-
ing requests: loss and corruption.
Loss is monitored with a handshaking mechanism, as seen in
ARQ protocols. When the request is sent, the timer associated
1The source identifies the interface generating the request/response (cf.
Figure 1). The destination can be deducted from the accessed address.
Alternatively, it can be stored as Virtual Channel (VC)+route.
TABLE II
AIQ ERROR NOTIFICATION SCENARIOS
REQ RESP
loss corrupt loss corrupt
Sender (master) X X X X
Receiver (slave) X OPT OPT
with the request is triggered. When the request is correctly
received, the slave’s AIQ sends an Acknowledgement (ACK)
packet back to the sender. If the ACK is correctly received,
the respective timer is stopped and the request is marked as
not pending, releasing the respective entry. The scenario is
illustrated in Figure 2b. If the ACK is not received, a timeout
will trigger the error detection activities. That occurs if the
request itself was lost or if the ACK was lost. In the former
case, the slave is unaware of the failed request and remains
unaffected by the error. That is illustrated in Figure 3a. In the
latter case, the slave received the request and will process it
correctly whereas the master cannot be certain that the request
was received. Thus, in both cases, only the master is notified
with a hardware interrupt in order to take appropriate action.
The master must be able to handle the “orphaned” responses.
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(b) Case 2: corruption
Fig. 3. Illustration of error affecting requests (REQ).
Upon loss detection, four actions are carried out at the
master:
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in
dedicated registers in the AIQ;
• the respective request table entry is released;
• the interface that issued the affected request is notified
to abort the transaction in order to allow the further
operation of the system;
• and a hardware interrupt is triggered so that appropriate
action can be taken in software.
For example, fault containment can be performed by the Real-
Time Operating System (RTOS) and error recovery can be
performed by a replica manager [13], [14]. Unaffected tasks
may continue executing normally.
Corruption is verified with an integrity check using EDC
and possibly ECC, both at the slave and at the master. The
integrity check is mandatory for control fields and optional for
data2. Requests with corrupt control fields are immediately
dropped to keep the integrity of the node – e.g., prevents
unintended access and modification (corruption) of memory
contents. As illustrated in Figure 3b, upon integrity of control
fields 2 the request is forwarded to the slave tile. The integrity
check of the data (when enabled) is performed on-the-fly as the
data is forwarded to the tile. That improves performance and
reduce hardware overhead by avoiding the use of large buffers.
The result of the integrity check is available when the last data
word of the request traverses the AIQ. Thus, possibly part of
the data might have already reached the tile (e.g., memory) by
the time the corruption is detected and signaled. Nonetheless,
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the signaling 3 will occur before the last word of the request
leaves the slave’s NI. The error is also signaled back to the
master 4 with a Negative Acknowledgement (NACK) packet.
Upon corruption detection, the following actions are carried
out at the slave:
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in
dedicated registers in the AIQ;
• the interface receiving the affected request is notified
to abort the transaction in order to allow the further
operation of the system;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropri-
ate action can be taken;
• a NACK is sent to the master in order to trigger the error
detection actions.
Upon the receipt of a NACK, the following actions are
carried out at the master:
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in
dedicated registers in the AIQ;
• the respective request table entry is released;
• the interface receiving the affected request is notified
to abort the transaction in order to allow the further
operation of the system;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropri-
ate action can be taken in software.
In case the NACK is not successfully received, e.g. due to the
failure of the NoC, the case will be handled as a request loss.
2) Responses: Similarly to requests, AIQ needs to account
for two cases when tracking responses: loss and corruption. In
both cases, error detection occurs with the same approach and
mechanisms as for requests. The difference lies in the error
reporting.
The loss of a response must be reported back to the master.
It can be optionally3 reported locally to the slave. Upon the
loss detection, the following actions are carried out at the
slave:
• a NACK is sent to the master in order to trigger the
error detection actions; the NACK will be transmitted
following Stop-and-Wait ARQ.
Optionally, the following actions can be carried out at the slave
to trigger a reaction locally:
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in
dedicated registers in the AIQ;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropri-
ate action can be taken.
Upon the receipt of a NACK, the following actions are
carried out at the master:
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in
dedicated registers in the AIQ;
• the interface receiving the affected request is notified
to abort the transaction in order to allow the further
operation of the system;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropri-
ate action can be taken in software;
2It is optional for data for cases where the written data will be checked
for integrity already in software. The data integrity check can be configured
during runtime in a memory range granularity, extending the configuration
capabilities of the IDAMC platform. The address is considered a control field
and its integrity check is mandatory.
3The lost response can be used to detect the failure of the NoC due to
hard errors or static effects, in which case the master will most likely fail to
receive the NACK. The tile contents are, however, unaffected by the loss and
requires no further action.
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of NI: identified limitations.
• the NACK is acknowledged (Stop-and-Wait ARQ).
The corruption of a response is detected and reported locally
to the master. Upon corruption detection, the following actions
are carried out at the master:
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in
dedicated registers in the AIQ;
• the interface receiving the affected request is notified
to abort the transaction in order to allow the further
operation of the system;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropri-
ate action can be taken.
E. Discussion and limitations
Due to the size and resource restrictions in a NoC in
comparison with an off-Chip network, two points that can
impact the performance and correct operation of the approach
were identified during design. They are described individually
in the sequel along with the applicability limitations of AIQ.
The first identified architectural limitation is related to how
received requests are handled by the interfaces of the NI.
When handling received requests, the NI handles each request
sequentially instead of handling them in parallel or buffering
the requests, which would be too costly and unnecessary
in most cases. Thus, subsequent requests and packets can
potentially be blocked due the backpressure. Figure 4 shows
a block diagram of the NI including the AIQ mechanism
(corruption detection with CRC is shown separately). The
backpressure is illustrated with the red arrow 1 . A request
is received by the Mst if interface and blocks the following
packets as indicated by the arrow. That interface will only
accept a next request after the current one has been served.
That can make the timing of the approach dependent on the
workload and on the internal details of the tile. The key impact
on AIQ is that the blocking introduces additional delay to
requests/responses, which are expected to be acknowledged
as soon as they arrive at the NI. Thus the latency becomes
dependent not only on the NoC topology and interfering traffic,
but also on the internal performance of the tile. The first point
is addressed in this work by bounding the maximum time that
an interface in the NI can take to process a request. The bound
must be realized by the NI and tile designs – e.g., the NI might
abort the request if it is not completed by the tile within the
specified bound; alternatively the tile can be designed to accept
multiple concurrent requests.
The second identified architectural limitation is related with
the NI’s input buffer (buffer phit2flit), which reassembles flow
control units (flits) from physical units (phits) and buffers
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-201903190937-0
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them until they can be forwarded to the upper layers of the
protocol stack. The flits of different VCs are stored in different
queues. It can happen that a control message of AIQ (ACK
or NACK) experiences head-of-line blocking depending on the
arbitration policy and depending on the type of packets queued
in front of it. That is illustrated by arrow 2 in Figure 4. The
situation can escalate to a deadlock, which will be detected as
a NoC error, when the Mst if is ready to respond a request
but no entries are available in AIQ’s tracking table. The
ACK that releases a table entry is then blocked in the buffer
phit2flit due to backpressure from Mst if. The deadlock can
be ruled out by using separate VCs for control packets and
for requests/responses. Alternatively, it can be ruled out by
ensuring that the number of concurrently received requests in
a tile is limited and do not block the control packets, e.g. by
using a resource manager [35]. The former solution is adopted.
As a mechanism integrated into the NoC, AIQ fails when
it is not able to detect and report errors anymore or when the
underlying NoC fails. AIQ itself is dimensioned to a single-
error scenario, i.e., either the error affects a request/response or
it affects the AIQ. For instance, either AIQ’s table will suffer
a bit flip, which can either be masked or cause the report of
an error, or the request/response, handled as expected. The
occurrence of a second error in a same request/response is
considered a failure.
Finally, notice that AIQ does not support broadcasts and
multicasts out-of-the-box since that functionality must be
supported by the architecture of the underlying real-time NoC,
which is not the case, e.g., in IDAMC to provide sufficient
independence to applications [1]. Moreover, AIQ is intended
for detecting errors in the NoC. Thus, error detection in tiles
and error handling are beyond AIQ’s responsibilities. Error
handling can be performed in the next levels of a hierarchical
fault-tolerance architecture or cross-layer solution. The limita-
tions of such a cross-layer solution depend on factors beyond
the scope of the NoC and AIQ, such as the actual software,
RTOS, scheduling policies and system-level requirements. The
dimensioning and validation of the cross-layer approach can
be made with tools such as [13], [36].
Next, the proposed AIQ mechanism is formally analyzed
with respect to communication time in the NoC, including the
aforementioned aspects.
IV. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF AIQ
Transport protocols, such as Go-Back-N ARQ and the
proposed AIQ, introduce additional flow control to the com-
munication. That comes from packets that are retained due to
handshaking or due to retransmissions with timeouts (in ARQ).
It creates a circular dependency where the performance of the
transport layer depends on the network latency, which in turn
depends on the traffic injected by the transport layer. Similar
to [11], we model such networks using Compositional Perfor-
mance Analysis (CPA) [37], which facilitates the integration
of network and transport layer analyses.
The formal timing analysis of AIQ is presented in three
parts. First, the modeling in CPA is introduced. Then, the pro-
tocol behavior in the error-free scenario in analyzed. Finally,
the error case is addressed with an analysis of the worst-case
latency in error reporting.
δpktδflt
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δaiq
DATA
ACK
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Port 1
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Router 2
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Port 1
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...
Fig. 5. Modeling of AIQ as a transport layer protocol and the underlying
NoC in CPA.
A. Modeling in CPA
CPA [37] relies on independent local analyses of the system
resources, such as router ports and CPUs, and a global analysis
loop that aggregates the local results to provide Worst-Case
Response Times (WCRTs) and jitter of tasks. The system
model is based on resources providing services, tasks consum-
ing these services, and event models specifying task activation
patterns. Task activations are triggered by an external source
or by events propagated from other tasks (predecessor tasks).
The activations in an event model are given by event arrival
curves η−(∆t) and η+(∆t), which return the minimum and
maximum number of events that can arrive in a given time
interval ∆t, respectively. Their pseudo-inverse counterparts
δ+(q) and δ−(q) return the maximum and minimum time
interval between the first and last events in any sequence of q
event arrivals, respectively. A conversion method is presented
in [38]. The analysis is then carried out in a local step and
global loop. In the local step, the local analysis derives each
task’s response time and output event model based on the the
busy window approach [39]. In a global loop, the analysis
propagates tasks’ output event models to their dependent tasks,
which, in turn, become their input event models. The analysis
stops when a fix point is reached and all event models are
stable or when predefined constraints are violated, such as a
maximum WCRT.
The modeling in CPA is based on the transport layer
analysis of [11] and illustrated in Figure 5. An interface in
the sender’s NI produces packets in a traffic stream according
with a given packet-based event model δtx. The packets are
handled at the transport layer by AIQ, which is modeled as a
resource. The analysis assumes that packets transmitted from
different interfaces within a NI are arbitrated according with
Strict Priority Non-Preemptive (SPNP) and also assumes that
ACKs and NACKs have the highest priority. Each interface
producing packets is modeled as a task τ mapped to that
resource – the interface under analysis is depicted as τaiq
whereas a lower priority one and a higher priority one are
depicted as τlp and τhp , respectively. Packets generated by
AIQ are captured by a dedicated task – e.g., ACKs transmitted
by the sender NI are captured by τack . AIQ then injects traffic
into the lower layers of the NoC according to the output event
model δaiq . Notice that only one interface (or AIQ itself) can
transmit a packet at a time and therefore only one output traffic
stream is depicted for the sender even though several traffic
streams can co-exist in the NoC and possibly originate in the
same sender.
A protocol with handshaking, such as AIQ, is a bidirectional
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communication stream [11]. As illustrated in Figure 5, the
communication is mapped in the NoC as two unidirectional
streams: one for data and one for acknowledgements in the
feedback path. As in [11], the underlying NoC analysis is arbi-
trary. This analysis assumes, without loss of generality, [40] as
the underlying NoC analysis, which models the NoC in CPA as
follows: each output port of a router is mapped as a resource,
and traffic streams are chains of tasks mapped to resources.
Resource arbitration depends on the router arbitration. The
output of the underlying NoC analysis used by the transport
analysis is the worst-case latency L+i of a packet transmitted
in a traffic stream i. The interested reader is referred to [11],
[40] for further details.
The analysis supports both packet-switched and wormhole-
switched NoCs. Packet-switched NoCs are supported by de-
fault. For wormhole-switched ones, however, a conversion
between event models is necessary, as seen in [11]. That is
depicted by the light blue elements in Figure 5. The conversion
between packet-based and flit-based event models can be
performed with the following equations [11]:
δ−flt,i(q) = max
{
(q − 1) · dmin , δ−pkt,i
( dq ÷ sizeie )
+ [(q − 1) mod sizei] · dmin
} (1)
δ−pkt,i(q) = δ
−
flt,i
(
(q − 1) · sizei + 1
)
(2)
where sizei is the size of any data packet in stream i (in flits),
and dmin is the minimum distance between two consecutive
flits [40]. For q ≤ 1, δ−flt,i(q) = 0 and δ−pkt,i(q) = 0.
B. Formal analysis: the error-free case
At first sight, the timing behavior of AIQ seems simi-
lar to Go-Back-N ARQ [11]. However, AIQ differs from
ARQ in that one instance in a NI is shared among traffic
streams whereas, in the latter, each traffic stream has its own
protocol instance. That makes a big difference. The latter
simplifies the analysis by exploiting the fact that all worst-
case processing delays and Round-Trip Times (RTTs) are
the same for the same traffic stream. In the former, worst-
case processing delays and RTTs of interfering packets are
potentially different, resulting in the more complex problem
of multi-server queues [41], [42]. The analysis of multi-server
queues is a hard problem, with a worst-case that is difficult
to tightly bound, and it is thus usually handled with Queueing
Theory [41]–[43]. Thus, to make the analysis problem feasible,
the worst-case analysis of AIQ assumes that there are enough
table entries for packets to be transmitted without contention
(unlimited number of entries). The adopted strategy allows
us to find out the number of entries required to achieve the
bounded performance. Similar analysis approaches are seen in
the literature [40], [44]. A violation of the assumption can be
monitored during runtime and be safely reported.
To obtain the worst-case end-to-end latency of a packet
protected by AIQ it is necessary to derive the interference of
other traffic in the NI and the contribution of the AIQ protocol
to the latency. That is captured by the WCRT of AIQ R+aiq,i,
which is the largest period of time in which a packet is retained
by the protocol. Similar to [11], the analysis relies on the busy
window approach [39]. The first step is to derive the Worst-
Case Multiple Packet Queuing Delay.
The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Queuing Delay Q+aiq,i(q)
is the longest time interval from the arrival of the first packet
until the q-th packet receives service. The Q+aiq,i(q) of stream
i is given by:
Q+aiq,i(q) = I
+
lp,i + I
+
hp,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q))
+ I+acks,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)) + (q − 1) ·O+aiq,i
(3)
where
I+lp,i = max
j∈lp(i)
{O+aiq,j} (4)
I+hp,i(∆t) =
∑
j∈hp(i)
η+tx,i(∆t) ·O+aiq,j (5)
I+acks,i(∆t) =
∑
j∈acks
η+tx,i(∆t) ·O+aiq,ack (6)
and where O+aiq,j is the maximum time that AIQ requires
to forward a packet of stream j; O+aiq,ack is the maximum
time that AIQ requires to create and forward an ACK;
lp(i) and hp(i) are the set of all lower and higher priority
streams mapped to the same AIQ as stream i, respectively;
and η+tx,i(∆t) is the maximum event arrival curve (cf. Sec-
tion IV-A). Equation 3 results in a fixed-point problem. It can
be solved iteratively, starting with a very small, positive .
Lemma 1. Equation 3 gives an upper bound on the Worst-
Case Multiple Packet Queuing Delay Q+aiq,i(q).
Proof. The proof is by induction. When q = 1, stream i’s
packet can be blocked by one non-preemtable, lower priority
packet that just started transmitting, assumed to be the largest
one causing the longest delay; while queued, the packet can
also be blocked by arriving higher priority packets; addition-
ally, the packet can also be blocked by ACKs, which are sent
with highest priority, generated due to receiving packets. That
is captured in Equation 3 by the terms I+lp,i, I
+
hp,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)),
and I+acks,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)), respectively.
In a subsequent q + 1-th activation, the packet has to addi-
tionally wait for its own previous q packets to be forwarded.
That takes O+aiq,i per packet, potentially increasing the interfer-
ence caused by higher-priority packets and acknowledgements
already captured by I+hp,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)) and I
+
acks,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)),
respectively. That results in Equation 3.
The Best-Case Multiple Packet Queueing Delay Q−aiq,i(q)
is the shortest time interval from the arrival of the first packet
until the q-th packet receives service. It is given by:
Q−aiq,i(q) = (q − 1) ·O−aiq,i (7)
where O−aiq,i is the minimum time that AIQ requires to forward
a packet of stream i.
Lemma 2. Equation 3 gives an upper bound on the Best-Case
Multiple Packet Queueing Delay Q−aiq,i(q).
Proof. The proof is by induction. When q = 1, stream i’s
packet can be forwarded as soon as it arrives. In a subsequent
q+1-th activation, the packet must wait at most for the previ-
ous q packets to be forwarded. That results in Equation 7.
The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B+aiq,i(q)
is the longest time interval from the arrival of the first packet
until the forwarding of the q-th packet. It extends Q+iaq,i(q)
until the q-th activation completes. The B+aiq,i(q) of stream i
is given by:
B+aiq,i(q) = Q
+
aiq,i(q) +O
+
aiq,i (8)
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Lemma 3. The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time
B+aiq,i(q) given by Equation 8 is an upper bound.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. Under SPNP, the
time to forward q packets corresponds to the time until the
q-th packet is about to receive service and the time it takes
to forward the q-th packet, which in non-preemtable. That
is captured by the first and second terms of Equation 8,
respectively. Both terms are upper bounds and Equation 8 is
thus an upper bound.
The Best-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B−aiq,i(q)
can be similarly derived. It is the shortest time interval from
the arrival of the first packet until the q-th packet is forwarded.
B−aiq,i(q) is given by:
B−aiq,i(q) = Q
−
aiq,i(q) +O
−
aiq,i (9)
Lemma 4. The Best-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time
B−aiq,i(q) given by Equation 9 is a lower bound.
Proof. The proof is omitted. It is similar to Lemma 3, but
using lower bounds instead.
The busy period waiq,i is the longest time interval in
which packets of stream i arrive at AIQ before the previous
packet has been transmitted. That is, it is a half-open interval
starting with the first activation and ending when activation q
completes before the arrival of the q + 1 activation. The busy
period waiq,i is given by:
waiq,i = max
q≥1,q∈N
{
B+aiq,i(q) |Q+aiq,i(q+1)≥δ−tx,i(q+1)
}
(10)
Lemma 5. The busy window is upper bounded by Equa-
tion 10.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a busy
window w˘aiq,i longer than waiq,i. In that case, w˘aiq,i must
contain at least one activation more than waiq,i, i.e., q˘ ≥ q+1.
From Equation 10, Q+aiq,i(q˘) < δ
−
tx,i(q˘), i.e., q˘ is not delayed
by the previous activation. Since that violates the definition of
a busy window, the hypothesis must be rejected.
The Worst-Case Response Time R+aiq,i is the longest time
interval that any packet of a stream i is delayed by AIQ before
being forwarded to the network. It is bounded by:
R+aiq,i = max
1≤q≤η+tx,i(waiq,i)
{B+aiq,i(q)− δ−tx,i(q)} (11)
Theorem 1. R+aiq,i (Equation 11) provides an upper bound on
the response time of an arbitrary packet in the traffic stream
i transmitted under AIQ.
Proof. The WCRT of an arbitrary packet in the traffic stream i
is obtained with the busy window approach [39]. The response
time of the q-th packet is the time between its arrival (δ−tx,i(q),
a lower bound) and its injection in the network (B+aiq,i(q),
an upper bound). The WCRT is then found as the maximum
among the response times of activations occurring inside the
busy window waiq,i [39]. It remains to prove that the busy
window is correctly captured by Equation 10, and that the
blocking captured in Equation 8 is an upper bound. Those are
proved in Lemmas 5 and 3, respectively.
The event model capturing the traffic injection of stream i
in the network by AIQ can now be derived. The output event
model δ−aiq,tx,i propagated by a NI with AIQ is obtained as
follows:
δ−aiq,tx,i(q) = max
{
δ−tx,i(q)−R+aiq +R−aiq, B−aiq(q − 1)
}
(12)
Theorem 2. The minimum distance function δ−aiq,tx,i(q) given
by Equation 12 is a lower bound.
Proof. Packets can leave AIQ as soon as they arrive but not
faster than AIQ is able to process them. That is captured by the
max function. The proof is by cases, with two cases that must
be lower bounds. The first case is when the packets leave the
AIQ as fast as they are arrive. Since packets can be affected
by delay in the AIQ resulting in a jitter (R+aiq −R−aiq) that is
propagated with the output event model. That is guaranteed
to be a lower bound. The proof is given in [45]. The second
case is that any q packets cannot be closer to each other in
time than rate with which AIQ is able to process. That is
captured by B−aiq(q−1), which is proved to be a lower bound
in Lemma 4. Since both cases are lower bounds, Equation 12
is also a lower bound.
The time it takes to transfer q packets can now be bounded,
where q might range from a single small packet to a long
DMA transfer4. The overall latency L+aiq,i(q) of transmitting
q data packets in a stream i is given by:
L+aiq,i(q) = δ
−
tx,i(q) + L
+
i +R
+
aiq,i (13)
where L+i is the worst-case NoC latency of any packet in
stream i, provided by the network analysis (cf. Section IV-A).
Theorem 3. Equation 13 gives an upper bound on the overall
latency to transmit q data packets under AIQ.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. The latency consists
of the time it takes for the sender to create q packets (δ−tx,i(q)),
plus the latency it takes for the last (q-th) packet to be delivered
by the network, plus the worst-case delay for that packet
introduced by AIQ (R+aiq,i) due to contention and handshaking.
Due to causality – i.e., packets cannot bypass each other –
all previous packets must have been received by the time the
last packet is received. Thus, Equation 13 is a valid upper
bound.
Finally, the time it takes to perform a NoC transaction
consisting of request and response under AIQ can be bounded.
The transaction latency L+trans(qreq, qresp) of a transfer com-
prising qreq request packets and qresp is given by:
L+trans(qreq, qresp) = L
+
aiq,req(qreq)+O
+
proc+L
+
aiq,resp(qresp)
(14)
where the request and the response consist of qreq and qresp
packets, respectively, and O+proc is an upper bound of the time
it takes for the transaction to be processed and responded (see
Section III-E).
Theorem 4. Equation 14 gives an upper bound on the overall
latency to complete a transaction.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. The latency of a
transaction consists of the latency to transmit the request, the
time it takes for the receiver to process the request and generate
a response, and the latency to transmit the response. That is
4DMA transfers can consist of a single, very long packet or multiple smaller
packets depending on the NoC architecture and configuration
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captured by the first, second and third terms of Equation 14.
From Theorem 3, the first and third terms are upper bounds.
The second term (O+proc) is an upper bound by definition.
Thus, Equation 14 is a valid upper bound.
C. Formal analysis: the error case
In this section, AIQ is analyzed with respect to its error
detection latency guarantees. In contrast to ARQ-based proto-
cols, which guarantee packet delivery, AIQ does not provide
error recovery and thus does not introduce itself additional
latency due to errors. Error recovery might be performed in
software and will certainly incur additional processing time,
whose worst-case behavior under errors has been analyzed,
e.g., by [13]. As summarized in Table II, two cases must be
detected by AIQ – loss and corruption. Upon detection, the
error must be notified to the local tile or to the remote tile
depending on whether the the affected packet was a request
or a response.
The worst-case impact of an error on the detection latency is
when the error causes a request/response loss, where the detec-
tion of a packet loss occurs upon the timeout event of a timer.
In contrast with the detection of corruption, which occurs at
the arrival of a request/response, the detection of packet loss
will always take longer due to the timeout. Such worst-case
error impact is similarly seen in ARQ-based protocols [11]. In
the sequel, the worst-case detection latency is analyzed with
respect to transient faults. The impacts of permanent faults and
permanent effects is discussed afterwards.
In case of request loss, only the local tile must be notified
(cf. Table II). The Worst-Case Error Detection Latency for
local reporting L+erraiq,i (q) is the longest time interval between
the transmission of a request on stream i until the notification
that its transmission on the NoC failed. It is given by:
L+erraiq,i (q) = δ
−
tx,i(q) +R
+
aiq,i + tout,i +O
+
aiq,int (15)
where tout,i is the timeout value for the request packet of
stream i and O+aiq,int is the maximum delay from timeout
detection until a hardware interrupt is raised. Similar to ARQ
protocols, the timeout must be chosen larger than the worst-
case RTT, usually including a safety margin – i.e., tout,i >
RTT+i .
In case of a response, a remote notification with a NACK is
required, which extends the notification latency. That is cap-
tured by the Worst-Case Error Detection Latency for remote
reporting L+err remaiq,i (q) and is given by:
L+err remaiq,i (q) = δ
−
tx,i(q) +R
+
aiq,i + tout,i + L
+
nack +O
+
aiq,int
(16)
where tout,i is the timeout value for the response packet of
stream i, and L+nack is the worst-case NoC latency of the
NACK packet (cf. Section IV-A).
It is possible that the NACK is delivered to the master
only after retransmission attempts, which can occur in mul-
tiple error scenarios in very high error rates. In that case,
k · tout,NACK can be appended to Equation 16 to account for
the k additional retransmissions with timeout tout,NACK .
In case of permanent faults or transient faults with static
effects causing the failure of the NoC, it is possible that the
NACK is not delivered at all. AIQ is also able to detect NoC
failures by monitoring the frequency of error occurrences and
by detecting the failure of a remote notification. In case of
network failure, a dedicated error single-wire signal, shared
among all nodes, can be employed to notify the failure to
the otherwise unreachable system controller. The controller
can then reset the NoC, which will cause the unavailability
of the NoC for some time, called Mean Down Time (MDT),
whose length depends on the hardware/software implemen-
tation. Moreover, the reset of the NoC must be carried out
in such a way that the remaining transactions are allowed to
finish, so that only the tasks whose transactions failed due to
an error will trigger recovery in software. Otherwise, a the
reset could induce the failure of all pending transactions and
lead therewith to an undesirable scenario.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
AIQ has been evaluated with respect to performance, imple-
mentation overhead, and achieved reliability and availability.
The objective of the experiments is to evaluate the impact of
AIQ on the regular performance of the MPSoC. AIQ’s impact
on performance under errors (single-error scenario) is upper
bounded by its impact on regular operation (cf. Section IV-C).
Notice that a clear distinction must be made between the
impact of AIQ and the impact of software execution in the
occurrence of errors – e.g., error handling routines. Only the
former is evaluated here. On the impact of errors on NoCs,
the interested reader can refer to [4], [10].
The performance was evaluated with the many-core plat-
form IDAMC [1]. Benchmark applications as well as an avion-
ics use case were executed on two versions of the platform: a
baseline version; and a version with AIQ. Moreover, two dif-
ferent mapping configurations are used to stimulate an extreme
scenario and one expected scenario. In the first scenario, the
applications are executed remotely inducing the direct impact
of the NoC latencies on the application performance – i.e., the
application code and data are mapped to memory in remote
tiles. In the second scenario, the application nodes execute
locally, emulating a Logical Execution Time execution model
with inter-core communication for synchronization and DMA
for data transfers – i.e., code and data mapped to local memory,
and shared memory communication and code download from
memory in remote tiles. The two scenarios provide a valuable
contrast between AIQ’s impact on the NoC traffic and the
impact of the NoC performance on the application’s execution.
Finally, the hardware implementation overhead of AIQ is
evaluated, followed by a reliability assessment and discussion.
The results presented in this section regard a VHDL design of
the IDAMC platform and AIQ simulated in Register-Transfer
Level (RTL) with QuestaSim [46] and synthesized as an
Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) with Design
Compiler [47].
A. Performance evaluation: benchmark applications
Let us start by evaluating the performance impact of AIQ
with CHSTONE benchmarks [48]. The benchmark applica-
tions were mapped to the IDAMC platform as depicted in
Figure 6. The applications’ code and data were mapped to a
remote memory, according with the first of the aforementioned
mapping configurations. In the setup, application tiles generate
traffic due to cache misses and evictions and due to uncached
data access. The applications were divided in two groups: one
group (light gray) accesses the memory in tile DRAM1 and the
other group (dark gray) accesses the memory in tile DRAM2.
The NoC is configured with XY routing for requests, YX
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Fig. 6. Mapping of the CHSTONE benchmark applications to the 3x3 NoC.
routing for responses, and a separate VC for each application.
The interested reader can refer to [1] and [4], [40] for more
details on the IDAMC and on the NoC, respectively.
The results of the RTL simulations can be seen in Figure 7,
which plots the latencies of NoC transactions of the differ-
ent applications as boxplots. Furthermore, the plot compares
latencies on an unprotected NoC (base) with latencies on a
NoC protected with AIQ. In a boxplot, the whiskers represent
the maximum and minimum, the box represents the second
and third quartiles, the horizontal line indicates the median
value, and the marker indicates the mean value. First, the
minimum latency increased 9 cycles in all applications. That
is due to the increase in the pipeline length in the NI as seen
in Figure 4. By introducing AIQ and the Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC) checker, the pipeline was extended by four
stages for a request and for a response. On average, the
latencies increased 16.1% across all applications. The standard
deviation increased from 0.42 cycles (AES) up to 2.90 cycles
(Blowfish). That is caused by the increased pipeline length
as well as the additional feedback traffic consisting of ACKs.
This experimental setup intentionally induces a high amount
of traffic whose performance strongly impacts the execution
time of the applications. Thus, execution time increase varied
from 10.8% (ADPCM) up to 15.5% (Motion), depending on
the application’s memory footprint. On average, the execution
times increased 12.6% across all applications.
Detailed results of the SHA application are shown in Fig-
ure 8. The figure plots the trace of latencies of NoC transac-
tions in time, comparing the cases with the unprotected and the
protected NoC. In the protected NoC, the latencies are slightly
longer and show a higher variance than in the unprotected one
due to the additional feedback traffic introduced by AIQ. In
fact, the average latency increases in about 14.9% from 94.94
to 109.11 clock cycles (cf. Figure 7). Due to high impact
of the NoC latencies on application performance artificially
induced by the experimental setup, the execution time of SHA
increased 12.66%. That can be considered as upper bound for
the overhead caused by AIQ on cache-enabled executions. As
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Fig. 7. Observed latency of NoC transactions of CHSTONE benchmarks in
a protected (AIQ) and unprotected NoC (Base), 8ns clock period.
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Fig. 8. Latency of transactions of the SHA application executing on an
unprotected NoC and on a NoC protected with AIQ, 8ns clock period.
seen next, the impact on performance of executions with local
memory is much lower.
B. Performance evaluation: avionics use case
Let us now evaluate AIQ with a parallelized avionics
application. Due to the high secrecy involving the develop-
ment of such systems, the experiments employ an Artificial
Demonstration Application (ADA) that mocks the dataflow
and workload of a Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning
System (HTAWS). The original application consists of mul-
tiple threads with DAL-C [7] executing on an SMP with an
RTOS. The main application dataflow, depicted in Figure 9a,
comprises four major pipeline stages. Two of the stages (De-
comp. and Draw) can be parallelized to increase performance
by exploiting the available data parallelism. A major frame
must be processed from input to output in at most 60ms. In the
original single core application, the four stages are executed
sequentially, with a period of 60ms. In the parallel version,
the stages are executed in a pipeline to increase the overall
throughput.
The application is mapped to a 2x4 instance of IDAMC,
as depicted in Figure 9b. Stages 1, 3 and 4 are mapped to
a single tile (L/I/D). Three instances of stage 2 are mapped
to different tiles (Decomp. #1, #2 and #3). Additionally,
interference is introduced in the platform by node Stream. src,
which generates DMA traffic to node Stream. dst with 4.8KB
DMA transfers. The system controller (System Ctrl.+RM)
initializes the platform and manages the access to shared
network resources by implementing a resource manager [35].
Figure 10 reports the execution time of ADA under different
setups in RTL simulations of the IDAMC platform. When
increasing the workload, specified as number of batches, ADA
takes between 1ms and 3.2ms to execute on IDAMC with an
unprotected NoC (Base). With a NoC protected with AIQ, the
execution takes from 1.4% to 7.1% longer (cf. Figure 10b). In
contrast to the benchmark applications evaluated in the pre-
vious section, these executions with AIQ present much lower
overhead. That is due to the more realistic setup expected in
real-time multi- and many-core platform environments, where
a clearer separation between computation and communication
is required to limit interference, to achieve predictability
1.
Load
2.
Decomp.
3.
Issue
4.
Draw
(a) ADA application.
System
Ctrl.+RM L/I/D
Decomp.
#1
Stream.
Dst.
Stream.
Src.
Decomp.
#2
Decomp.
#3
-
(b) Mapping on 2x4 NoC.
Fig. 9. ADA application and its mapping to a 2x4 IDAMC, including
interfering applications.
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Fig. 10. Response time comparison of ADA with a protected NoC (AIQ) and
an unprotected one (Base).
and to avoid prohibitive analytical over-approximations. That
trend can be seen in predictable execution models such as
superblocks [49], [50].
Figure 11 reports the latencies of NoC transactions observed
in the scenario with 4 batches. The plot shows, as boxplots, the
observed latencies of NoC transactions initiated by different
ADA application nodes with and without AIQ. The average
transaction latencies increase between 14.8% and 19.7% with
AIQ. The minimum latencies increase 15.5% due to the
additional cycles required by the extended pipeline in the NIs.
The observed maximum, however, slightly decreased from
3.9% to 7.8% due to slightly different network traffic patterns
resulting, e.g., from the interaction with the feedback traffic.
The standard deviation increased at most 1.91 cycles (L/I/D)
and decreased at most 1.33 cycles (Decomp. 2).
Although non-negligible, the observed performance over-
heads are low in comparison with other software and
hardware-based fault-tolerance approaches for safety-critical
real-time systems [12], [51]. Evaluating only timing can be
a pitfall since the cost of the approach might be hidden.
For instance, in case of Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR)
or Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) in processors with
lock-step execution [12], the performance overhead is low or
negligible, the remaining overhead is hidden in the hardware
implementation. That is evaluated in the sequel.
C. Implementation overhead
Let us now evaluate the implementation overhead of AIQ.
The evaluation features a baseline NI and NIs protected with
different configurations of AIQ. The designs were synthesized
with Synopsys Design Compiler [47] in an ASIC design-
flow with UMC 65nm cell libraries (high and low threshold
voltage, worst-case corner 0.9V 125C) targeting a frequency
of 125MHz; and with TSMC 28nm cell libraries (high and
standard threshold voltage, worst-case corner 0.72V 125C)
targeting a frequency of 1GHz. The evaluation involved a NI
configured with four interfaces: DMA if. for DMA transfers;
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Fig. 11. Observed latency of NoC transactions of ADA with 4 batches in a
protected (AIQ) and unprotected NoC (Base), 8ns clock period.
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Fig. 12. ASIC synthesis results (65nm UMC) for a NI with AIQ (2, 4 and 8
entries) and without it (U).
Mst if. for remote NoC transactions; Slv if. for initiating NoC
transactions; and IRQ if. for interrupt forwarding.
Figure 12 details the cell area of four different versions
of the NI and their internal components: baseline (B) and
different configurations of AIQ (2, 4, and 8) where AIQ
is equipped with tracking tables with 2, 4 and 8 entries,
respectively. In the figures, besides the four aforementioned
interfaces, the NI is further divided into mux and demux
(DE/MUX), which connect the interfaces to the lower layers
of the NoC; the lower layers of the NoC are captured by
Others. The AIQ is subdivided into the core AIQ and the CRC
integrity check (CRC gen and CRC check). The results also
show Addr.Transl., which contains the NoC routes and VCs
(source routing) as well as local and remote address mapping.
In a 65nm UMC ASIC, a NI implementing AIQ with
2 table entries requires 9.6% additional silicon area. The
implementation overhead of AIQ is introduced by the main
AIQ component and the CRC integrity check. The main con-
tributors to the area increase are the integrity check (CRC gen.
and CRC check), which correspond for approx. 82.9% of the
additional logic. The main component (AIQ) contributes with
only approx. 17.1% of the additional logic, since it replaces
the original multiplexer and demultiplexer (DE/MUX). When
increasing the number of entries from 2 to 4, 2.2% additional
logic is required (in total, 12.0% additional logic from U to 4).
Further doubling the number of entries from 4 to 8 requires
4.2% additional logic (in total, 16.7% additional logic from U
to 8). Nonetheless, the area requirements of AIQ are expected
to decrease with more efficient designs and implementations
of the NI and of AIQ itself.
The energy consumption was evaluated with Synopsys
PrimeTime [52] using the 65nm netlist. Under full load
(single-word memory accesses with random payload), the NI
equipped with AIQ (2 entries) consumes 8.03% more energy
than baseline. For a larger AIQ with 4 and 8 entries the energy
overhead is 9.24% and 11.52%, respectively. When idle (no
traffic), the overheads are 6.45%, 7.70% and 9.91% for AIQ
with 2, 4 and 8 table entries, respectiely.
Let us now compare the hardware cost of the AIQ approach
with the resilient NoC [4] and the DMR and TMR approaches
[53]. DMR is able to detect errors of the NoC but it is neither
able to pin-point nor to recover from them. As AIQ, DMR can
be used to detect errors and achieve integrity. TMR is able to
detect errors and also is able to detect which NoC instance is
faulty. It can tolerate one error and continue operating.
Figure 13 shows the cost in terms of silicon area of a 5x5
NoC where every router is connected to a NI. Two different
technology nodes are used: UMC’s 65nm and TSMC’s 28nm.
Before discussing the results some considerations are required.
First, the figure is intended to compare the overhead of
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Fig. 13. Comparison of approach overhead for a 5x5 NoC (65nm UMC and
28nm TSMC ASICs).
different approaches in a same technology node. A comparison
between the different technology nodes is provided in the
sequel (Figure 14). Second, the costs of DMR and TMR do not
include the voter and recovery logic, and the Resilient NoC’s
NIs use a large AIQ as a lower bound for a full-featured ARQ
implementation. Third, the results do not account for the link
wires, which are highly dependent on the place and routing of
the entire MPSoC.
The total cost of implementing AIQ and ensuring the
predictability and integrity of a 5x5 NoC is 3.74% in 65nm
(4.78% in 28nm) when equipping the NIs with AIQ instances
with 2 table entries (AIQ 1). When considering that two NIs
are potential bottlenecks and require larger AIQ instances with
8 table entries (AIQ 2), the cost raises slightly to 4.08%
in 65nm (5.19% in 28nm). Even when all NIs feature large
AIQs, the cost corresponds to 6.52% in 65nm (not plotted).
In contrast with DMR and its >100% overhead, AIQ requires
just a fraction of the resources to provide the same guarantees.
In order to further achieve resilience and high reliability, the
resilient NoC approach requires 12.06% additional silicon in
65nm (14.76% in 28nm). In comparison with AIQ, that is
roughly three times the overhead. In comparison to TMR, not
only is the resilient NoC much more efficient with respect
to resource usage (area) and power but also more effective.
Besides, DMR and TMR imply a significant increase in the
number of interconnecting wires, which can lead to circuit
routing complications, potential congestion and lower frequen-
cies during implementation.
A comparison between the two technology nodes can be
seen in Figure 14 with the gate equivalent metric, which mea-
sures the manufacturing-technology-independent complexity
of a digital circuit [54]. The gate equivalent unit corresponds
to the design silicon area divided by the area of a reference
cell in the same technology node. The usual two-input drive-
strength-one NAND cell (NAND2) is employed here. In 28nm,
slightly larger overheads can be observed. That comes from
the fact that different cells in a cell library – e.g., sequential,
combinational, and their different variations – have different
sizes. When scaling down the technology node from 65nm
to 28nm, the corresponding cells in the library do not scale
equally. That results in the case where, e.g., sequential cells
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Fig. 14. Gate-equivalent comparison of approach overhead in different ASIC
technology nodes (65nm UMC and 28nm TSMC) for a 5x5 NoC.
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A 5x5 NoC size is considered.
in the smaller technology node are relatively larger than the
combinatorial cells, in comparison with the larger technology
node. Thus, although the design is the same, the proportion
between different cells (e.g., sequential and combinatorial) in
the implementation results in a different area overheads. Those
effects can also be observed with the baseline design: notice
that the baseline design requires relatively more silicon area
(between 4% and 5%) in 28nm than in 65nm.
Regarding maximum achievable frequency, no impact of
AIQ has been noticed in 65nm or 28nm – i.e., the critical-
path lies in one of the interfaces in all NI configurations.
D. Reliability
To put into perspective what can be achieved with such
overheads, let us evaluate the reliability. The reliability is
evaluated by means of the reliability metric R(t), which is the
probability that the NoC does not fail during a time interval
[0, t] [53]. We reuse the definition of [4], which defines failure
in a high dependability mixed-critical real-time system as the
violation of integrity, resilience or real-time latency guarantees
due to errors, including static effects leading to blocking.
Packet loss is not considered as a failure for and AIQ and
the Resilient NoC because it is handled in the transport layer.
The evaluation considers Bit Error Rates (BERs) from 10−12
up to 10−9/hour, which accounts for the BERs expected5 in
practice and the design safety margin [59]. Additionally, a
permanent fault rate6 of 10−11/h per router is considered. The
occurrence of a permanent fault leads directly to failure.
Figure 15 plots the analytical R(t) for the unprotected,
baseline NoC and the NoC protected with AIQ considering
a 5x5 2D-mesh topology, excluding the NIs. The plot also
includes the Resilient NoC [4] and variants of the baseline
NoC with DMR (Base+DMR) and TMR (Base+TMR). The
DMR and TMR have ideal voters and the latter is non-
reparable [53]. Although DMR can ensure the integrity of
the system, the extra redundant hardware implies higher sus-
ceptibility to errors and results in a less reliable NoC than
baseline. The same is seen for TMR, whose capability of
withstanding one error does not pay off the extra redundant
hardware. On the other hand, AIQ captures all violations of
integrity and real-time requirements and is able to increase the
reliability in about one order of magnitude w.r.t. the baseline
NoC. However, there still exists the possibility that a soft
error affects the state of the NoC and causes static effects,
leading the blocking of the NoC [4], [10], which still limits the
reliability in time. That scenario can either be prevented with
5BERs derived [55] for sequential and combinational logic with data from
[56] for 65nm CMOS SRAM. Masking effects [57] are not taken into account.
BERs in smaller geometries, including FinFETs, have been shown to be
decreasing [58] and are thus conservatively covered by the derived BERs.
6The fault rate per router is derived from processor failure rates in [60].
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF MTTFS IN HOURS
BER/h 3x3 5x5 8x8
Base 10
−12 5.36 · 105 6.07 · 103 8.65 · 103
10−9 5.36 · 102 6.07 · 101 8.65 · 100
AIQ 10
−12 4.96 · 106 5.63 · 105 8.04 · 104
10−9 4.96 · 103 5.63 · 102 8.04 · 101
AIQ+R & 10−12 1.11 · 1010 4.00 · 109 1.56 · 109
Resilient NoC 10−9 1.11 · 1010 4.00 · 109 1.56 · 109
a Resilient NoC [4] approach or it can be handled by resetting
the NoC back to a valid state with a version of AIQ with NoC
resetting capabilities (AIQ+R). AIQ+R and Resilient achieve
equally high reliability, since all soft errors in the NoC can be
detected and handled by both techniques, at which point hard
errors then become the limiting factor.
The conclusions above can also be seen in Table III, which
reports the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) in hours for
different NoC sizes and BERs. Even in small topologies, non-
resilient NoCs present very low MTTFs and consequently very
high failure rates. On average, an 8x8 NoC is expected to be
struck by a soft error from every 360 days in a regular envi-
ronment (BER 10−12) up to every 8.65 hours in an aggressive
environment (BER 10−9). Most of those errors present only
transient effects and will be handled in software. However,
some of them present static effects and their recovery requires
resetting the NoC’s state. Those are seldom and are expected
to occur, on average, every 80.4 hours under BER 10−9. The
recovery requires cycles of downtime and thus impacts the
NoC availability, which is evaluated next.
Figure 16 reports the unavailability of the NoC, as the
complement of its availability (U = 1−A) for different sizes
and BERs when varying the MDT. Even for very high BERs,
with the MDT in the range of microseconds, the NoC still
presents very high availability. As the MDT approaches a
tenth of a second, the system experiences longer interruptions
due to the NoC recovery, which is likely to compromise its
timeliness and violate, already at design time, the real-time
guarantees. Thus, fast software routines should be used with
hardware support to ensure low MDTs and the applicability
of the approach. Alternatively, in case the availability is too
low due to a combination of long MDTs, high BERs and large
NoC sizes, the Resilient NoC approach [4], which ensures the
availability of the NoC in hardware, can be employed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented AIQ, an end-to-end mecha-
nism to provide integrity and real-time guarantees for NoC
transactions under random hardware faults. When integrated,
the mechanism results in a low-overhead fault-tolerant NoC
capable of detecting errors and ensuring that their effects are
contained in time in order to maintain the system’s predictabil-
ity and integrity. AIQ explores the idea of keeping track of
transactions of distributed systems in the context of NoCs
for predictable real-time systems. Upon error detection, error
handling and recovery are delegated to software, which may
react according to an arbitrary strategy, as seen in cross-layer
fault-tolerance approaches. The mechanism was evaluated in
the many-core research platform IDAMC considering aspects
such as performance, implementation costs, reliability and
availability. The experimental evaluation features benchmark
applications as well as an industrial avionics use case in
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Fig. 16. Unavailability of the NoC with AIQ+R when varying the MDT.
scenarios for real-time systems. AIQ operates with low hard-
ware overhead and low impact on performance, as seen in
an avionics use case with execution times between 1.4% and
7.1% longer.
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